Adam Smith, '<i>Theory of Moral Sentiments</i>', K. Haakonssen (ed.): Review by Metzger, E.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Metzger, E. (2003) Adam Smith, 'Theory of Moral Sentiments', K. 
Haakonssen (ed.): Review. Edinburgh Law Review, 7 (2). pp. 260-262. 
ISSN 1755-1692 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/38048/ 
 
Deposited on: 02 April 2012 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
260 THE EDINBURGH LAW REVIEW Vol 7 2003
modern period and how the problem of resistance was dealt with during it. Moreover, one of
the aims behind the collection is to set out some perspectives for research, following what
Friedeburg calls the "Paradigmenwandel" ("conceptual shift") that has taken place since the
last collection on this topic, which dates from 1972 {Widerstandsrecht, ed by Arthur
Kaufmann). Contemporary research aims to understand the early modern period on its own
terms and with its own (political) language. According to Friedeberg (15), historical research
should not aim in the first place to provide guidelines for contemporary action("Handlungsrezepte"). Rather, it can create room for reflection, so that we can be warned
against producing simple answers to complicated (modern) questions. As the editor himself
writes (56), the contributions in this new volume do not, and cannot, provide a new synthesis
on the topic. What they do provide is an overview of some of the results of current research
on the topic in Germany and in English-speaking countries. It is, however, regrettable that
none of the contributors to this volume is a jurist (or, at least, none of them is attached to a
law faculty). Without any doubt, the right of resistance is also a legal topic, which will attract
readers and scholars interested in law.
In conclusion, I would suggest that those looking for a comparison of the German and
the British sources on resistance in the early modern period should first turn to Friedeburg's
monograph of 1999, rather than to the collection here reviewed. It is necessary to read this
study to understand why Friedeburg is especially interested in a "Vergleich" between the
German and the British sources, rather than, for instance, between the German and the
French sources. On the other hand, the volume reviewed here will be of use, first, to those
wanting to acquire a better knowledge of the specific topics and problems in the German
and the British regions, and, secondly, to those looking for the results of recent research.
Gustaaf van Nifterik
Lecturer in European Legal History
Free University ofAmsterdam
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Adam Smith, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS. Ed by Knud Haakonssen
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Cambridge Texts in the History ofPhilosophy,
xxxi and 411 pp (incl index). ISBN 0 521 59847 8 (pb). £15.95.
This is a students' edition of Smith's great work on morals, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments,based on the sixth and last edition revised by Smith, and following closely the critical edition
published in 1976. The text is lightly but skilfully annotated throughout, drawing on previous
editions but also on Haakonssen's own substantial work on Smith. Readers other than students
will find the annotations useful. Also, readers familiar with other editions will notice that
Haakonssen has been especially generous with references to Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence(1976), making this edition particularly useful to lawyers.
There is very little to criticise. The publisher might have added headings at the top of
each page, to allow the reader to find sections and subsections more easily. Also, the publisher
must be aware that the critical edition of this text, reprinted by Liberty Fund of Indianapolis,
USA, at present is selling at a price far less than this edition.
But otherwise this is an excellent book for students. Alongside the annotations, Haakonssen
has included certain material which was omitted by Smith in the course of the work's
publication history, but which a student ought to know about. There is, for example, thefamous "passage on atonement" at the end of II.2.3.12 but omitted from the last edition,
where Smith joins his own account of natural sentiments to an orthodox view of Christian
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redemption. The section to which this passage was appended is devoted to an attack on
Hume's belief that the perceived disutility of an act is the foremost reason why a person
restrains himself from that act. The student may see the omission of the passage on atonement
as a gesture of politeness to his dead friend, or a change of views, or its inclusion in earlier
editions as a sop to his Christian audience. Whatever the reason, the omitted passage is
rightly included in a students' edition (as are the related omissions at III.2.31, 32). The
same is true of the emendations which Haakonssen flags at 1.3.1.9, where Smith, following
the advice of Hume, makes clear to his audience, from the second edition onwards, that
the very fact of being in accord with the feelings of another person produces an agreeable
sensation, quite apart from the sentiments which arise from that accord. It is partly thanks to
Hume that Smith's particular use of the word "sympathy" is reasonably well understood
today.
Haakonssen's introduction gives some of Smith's ideas in outline and discusses them
briefly in comparison with the ideas of his predecessors. There is a lot in a little space.
Haakonssen's description ofend-utility and means-utility is shorter and clearer than a student
will find elsewhere, and his description of sympathy as "spontaneously see[ing] people as
purposeful" (xiv) is very good. Haakonssen also takes aim at "Smith the Stoic" and "Smith
the virtue theorist", which are both in fashion today.
An equally important matter for this review is the place of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments
in the law curriculum. Jurisprudence textbooks published in Britain tend to present writers
chronologically. This gives the false impression that jurisprudence enjoys a kind of scientific
progress, and that each theory betters an earlier one. Yet the only Scot who fits easily into
this approach is Hume, who makes a brief appearance to subvert natural law and then
disappears (would Hume have appreciated being presented as the father of legal positivism?
I doubt it). Even if a student stays with Hume long enough to discover the artificial virtue of
justice, he will probably take away no more than the half-message that the justness of an act
is not permanent and universal but highly variable with the circumstances. This again pushes
the student towards positivism. Why would such a student bother to read in Smith a fuller
empirical account of justice? The student would see it as painting the lily, or worse, a retreat
to the past: when he or she opens The Theory of Moral Sentiments and sees words like
"natural", "God", and "higher tribunal" on nearly every page, he or she may assume that this
is a treatise on natural law.
If the textbooks were less chronological and more thematic, Smith might fit in better and
his value to law studies might become clearer. Smith's theory of justice is different from the
normative theories of justice that dominate students' thinking. Students accept that laws
create generalisations, and they are taught to ask what exactly ought to be generalised. Utility?
A balance of goods? Cultural authenticity? In Smith they will find the beginnings of an
entirely different tradition, where the generalisations created by laws are always imperfect
and always secondary to the sentiments of the actors. The student, who is perhaps accustomed
to dismissing "sentiment" as a shorthand for bias, caprice, and self-interest, will discover that
sentiment can be discussed scientifically, that is to say, causally, to a degree of precision that
Hume never approaches. And though an actor's opinion ofhis or her own conduct is ultimately
"caused" by the opinions of others, the student will find that the actor is fully capable of
virtuous acts even under universal disapproval. For lawyers, Smith's principal lesson in The
Theory ofMoral Sentiments is not that there are certain values natural to human beings, but
that human beings naturally follow a certain mechanism for making moral judgments, and
that any laws a lawmaker cares to promulgate will pass through that mechanism, whether the
lawmaker likes it or not. That is a good lesson for law students as well.
The book on justice Smith hoped to complete in his lifetime was never completed, and
the drafts were burnt at his death. The two surviving accounts of his jurisprudence lectures
at Glasgow give illustrations of his theory of justice, but not the theory itself. The Theory of
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Moral Sentiments is therefore the right book for law students. This edition, together with
Campbell's Adams Smith's Science of Morals (1971), and Haakonssen's The Science of a
Legislator (1981), will give students what they need to know.
Ernest Metzger
Senior Lecturer in Law
University ofAberdeen
EdinLR Vol 7 pp 262-264
Gianfrancesco Zanetti, POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP AND THE GOOD LIFE
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002. xi and 146 pp (incl index). ISBN 90 411 1881 0 (hb). £43.50.
In Political Friendship and the Good Life Gianfrancesco Zanetti looks at the debate over the
place of the ideal of the good life in the decision-making processes of the state. This topic has
been the object of extensive discussion, especially over the last few decades, and has attracted
the interest of classical philosophers and contemporary scholars alike. Zanetti's contribution
to this debate is powerful and original. He does not confine himself to examining along
traditional lines the complex debate on the role that ideals such as the good life, and human
well-being should play in political decision-making: he also contributes to the discussion in a
refreshing way, presenting us with an original and valuable addition to the existing literature.
The book is clearly set out. The first three chapters enter into an extensive critical analysis
ofAristotle's and Kant's political thought: the stage is set here in which are introduced various
key notions, such as happiness, individualism, autonomy, holism, good life, and well-being,
that figure centrally in the reasoning developed later on. Zanetti then expounds his views on
the role that the ideal of the good life should have in the State's decision-making processes.
This presentation takes up the fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth chapters and develops along an
essentially liberal line of reasoning. Finally, the sixth to eighth chapters are mainly devoted to
applying the previously expounded general views to specific issues, such as the legal
enforcement ofmorality and the idea of friendship. In these chapters, the positions of Patrick
Devlin, Michael Sandel, John Finnis, Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin are discussed at
length.
Throughout the book Zanetti argues for a liberal approach to the relation between the
ideal of good life and political decision-making. He observes that in recent years liberal
positions have come under fire from various quarters: from neo-natural law theorists, from
communitarians and from non-individualistic approaches, to name but a few. Zanetti admits
that some works upholding non-liberal positions stand their ground in many ways. In particular,
he acknowledges some merit to what is known as "perfectionism", namely, the political stance
by which a government may legitimately promote an idea ofgood life and arrange institutions
so as to maximise the achievement of human excellence. Nevertheless, Zanetti puts forward
two basic arguments against the perfectionist view.
The first supports a weak form of anti-perfectionism and turns on the need to defend a
so-called
"right to unhappiness". Such an argument develops the idea that we as individuals
have desires, aspirations, and goals that cannot necessarily be fulfilled simply by our taking
part in community life, and hence are not inevitably concordant with the desires, aspirations,
and goals of the body politic as a whole. For this reason the possibility will have to be leftperpetually open that the relations between the "parts" and the whole—individuals with
their aspirations on the one hand, the state and the common idea of the good embodied
therein on the other—are not entirely harmonious: this possibility is by no means merely an
accident. Consequently, a system should be informed by principles allowing individuals to
express their dissent and to choose their own ways of life independently. The option of so
